The Huawei affair that occurred last year in several European institutions highlighted the extent of the means deployed by Beijing to defend its control over global digital infrastructures. Searches took place in more than twenty locations in Europe, and two European Parliament offices were placed under seal as part of an investigation targeting the Chinese telecommunications giant.
According to investigators, Huawei tried to influence European decision-makers by offering tickets to football matches, luxury trips and money to certain parliamentarians. This case came at a time when the European Union was considering limiting the use of Chinese technologies in 5G networks. For the Washington Post, analyst and president of the StrategEast Center for a New Economy, Anatoly Motkin, returns to the Chinese “technological trap”.
Beyond the scandal, the Huawei episode reveals a broader Chinese strategy: using digital contracts as levers of political and economic influence. For Anatoly Motkin, the real danger is not limited to the risks of espionage or security breaches, but lies in the progressive dependence of countries on Beijing. On this subject, he speaks of a “Silicon Curtain”, a silicon curtain which would separate two development models.
This curtain is not a geographical border like the old Iron Curtain, but a dividing line based on supply choices, that is to say on the suppliers selected to build 5G networks, host public data or finance digital infrastructures. On one side are systems based on transparency, competition and open rules; on the other, models marked by state control, surveillance and strong financial opacity.
Dangerous technological vassalization
The attraction of Chinese companies is real, because their offers are often 30 to 40% cheaper than those of their Western competitors. But these low prices are not about generosity: they mainly serve to establish lasting dependence in essential sectors. Once Chinese equipment is adopted, the client country often becomes dependent on Beijing for maintenance, updates and financing.
The Chinese New Silk Roads initiative operates, according to Anatoly Motkin, in a deliberately opaque manner. Contracts are rarely made public, loan conditions are not very transparent and financing comes from Chinese state banks. Several projects have also been marked by suspicions of fraud or corruption, which reinforces the idea of a system designed to block partner States’ access to technological autonomy.
This dependence manifests itself at three levels: equipment, skills and debt. Infrastructure installed with Chinese hardware is difficult to replace without rebuilding the entire network, which can cost billions. Local staff are often trained as users rather than engineers, which prevents them from regaining control in the event of a break with the supplier. Finally, loans granted by Chinese banks can increase public debt to such an extent that the initial savings quickly disappear.
Conversely, some countries that have chosen to limit their exposure to China have achieved better economic and technological results. India excluded Huawei and ZTE from its 5G trials, Vietnam diversified its trade and developed a powerful technology export industry, while Rwanda attracted varied investments and grew its digital sector. Anatoly Motkin’s conclusion is clear: the digital future of a country must not be decided solely on the price of the supplier, but by keeping in mind a crucial notion, that of its independence.
