The Shahed-136 is originally an Iranian kamikaze drone, which has become a pillar of the Russian arsenal since the start of its large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. First delivered by Iran, it is now produced in Russia under the name Geran-2. Inexpensive, with great autonomy and a substantial explosive charge, it has established itself as an essential tool for deep strikes and Russian tactical operations in Ukraine. But the Ukrainian army, faced with this threat, has developed increasingly effective methods to counter it, forcing Moscow to react, analyzes the American magazine Forbes.
Faced with the increase in Shahed drone attacks, Ukraine has established an anti-aircraft defense doctrine capable of quickly adapting to enemy tactics. When Russia began launching decoy drones to saturate Ukrainian defenses, kyiv was able to react, neutralizing both the decoys and the real Shaheds, thanks to a mixture of kinetic (firearms, missiles) and non-kinetic (electronic jamming) countermeasures. On January 25, 2025, the Ukrainian Air Force, for example, announced that it had intercepted sixty-one Shahed drones: fifteen were jammed, forty-six shot down, none reached their target.
Electronic jamming neutralizes about half of the low-flying drones sent by the Kremlin. Equipment is regularly updated to exploit weaknesses in Russian systems, which in turn attempt to adapt to Ukrainian countermeasures. For drones that slip through the cracks, kyiv adapts its response according to altitude: fighter planes intercept devices at high altitude, while mobile teams equipped with machine guns attack those flying lower.
In recent weeks, however, as Moscow has intensified its strikes, the situation seems to have changed. On June 25, out of seventy-one Shahed drones launched, thirty-two were shot down, twenty jammed, but nineteen hit their targets. This increase is not insignificant and marks a shift: Russian drones are piercing Ukrainian defenses more often.
Armor, submunitions and new tactics
Shahed’s latest models are actually more durable. Their engine compartment is armored to resist machine gun fire and the fuel tanks, previously located in the wings, have been moved to the body of the drone. Result: it became much more difficult to kill a Shahed with a single shot. Some versions even carry submunitions, which they drop in flight before crashing on their targets, widening the impact zone and making the drone more effective against concentrations of troops or fortified positions.
The Russian army is no longer content with launching isolated drones. It now sends them in pairs, one flying low to hide the other, higher, from Ukrainian radars. The drone located at altitude thus benefits from the radar saturated by the first, which gives it more time to reach its target. Another innovation: the Shaheds are now accompanied by Lancet drones, smaller and more difficult to detect, which track the Ukrainian teams responsible for the interception. By neutralizing these teams, the Lancets open the way for the Shaheds, who can then strike unhindered.
Faced with these developments, Ukraine must constantly reinvent its defense strategy. Ukrainian engineers are working to improve detection systems to counter drone duo tactics, and ground teams are increasing the protection of their vehicles by equipping themselves with more powerful rifles to inflict more damage on the drones. kyiv also struck a production factory in Shahed, to slow the flow of these suicide drones at the source.
Since the start of the Russian invasion, this war has been a constant race for technological and tactical innovation. Russia improves its drones, Ukraine adapts its defenses and the cycle begins again… For how much longer?
