To continue its progress in Ukraine, the Russian army needs vehicles. Since the outbreak of the large -scale conflict in February 2022, the Kremlin has emptied its stocks and has already used tanks dating from the Cold War, civil cars or even reinforced golf carts. Faced with colossal losses of armored vehicles –20,000 since the start of the invasion, according to Forbes magazine-the Russian army is constrained today to call on the Gaz69, a vehicle whose manufacturing dates back to the early 1950s.
The Gaz 69 was one of the first all-terrain vehicles developed in the Soviet Union. With four -wheel drive and weighing 1,690 kg, the Soviet equivalent of the American Jeep was produced for the first time in 1953 in the Moscow Molotov factory which assembled for twenty years. Despite its success in Russia, but also throughout the Soviet Union or in China, we thought it had been missing for a long time. But this light artillery tractor on wheels would have returned to the forehead.
As evidenced by recent photos taken near the front line in Ukraine, at least one Gaz69 (ATK-L 69 military appellation) would have been equipped with drone protective screens, in order to extend its extraordinary longevity a little more.
Russians are preparing almmost 75-year-cold gaz 69, produced since 1952, for sending to the front. pic.twitter.com/j8lrctm8hc
– Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) March 28, 2025
Faced with armored vehicle losses exceeding their replacement capacity, whether by a new production or the reactivation of old stocks today almost exhausted, Russia relies on … which it finds. The use of old Soviet trucks is no longer limited to logistics: today, they are above all mobilized to carry out attacks against Ukrainian positions, symbol of a Russian military-industrial complex under tension for several months, struggling to support the imperialist ambitions of Vladimir Putin.
It was not their war
On the battlefield, these civil vehicles are pale. More vulnerable to attacks by Ukrainian drones, their ability to carry out effective offensives is largely questioned. Their mobilization seems all the more unsuitable in a war where the outcome depends above all on the ability to take the advantage in a less visible, but crucial battle: the technological battle.
According to an analysis carried out by Andrew Perpetua, observer of the war in Ukraine very active on social networks, around 70% of Russian losses today concern armored trucks and civil vehicles, ranging from vans to compact cars confiscated in occupied areas.
By favoring civilian transport on front lines, the Russian regiments are likely to speed up the process of removing their army, these vehicles being even more vulnerable than armored vehicles, which have become rare and preciously preserved for large -scale operations.
This situation obliges the Russian soldiers on the field to improvise, some having been seen moving in an electric scooter, others on horseback and even on donkey, as reported by the New York Post.
